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THE CASE FOR REAUTHORIZING SECTION 
FIVE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
JOHN MICHAEL EDEN 
INTRODUCTION 
The key provision1 of the most effective civil rights law ever 
enacted2—Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA or the Act)—will 
expire in 2007 if it is not reauthorized.3 Section 5, also known as 
preclearance, requires that jurisdictions fitting a statutorily-defined 
profile submit all changes “with respect to voting” to the Attorney 
General or to the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.4 To satisfy preclearance, these jurisdictions must establish 
that the prospective voting procedure “does not have the purpose and 
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color.” Moreover, the proposed change cannot 
have a deleterious impact on the voting rights of minority language 
 
Copyright © 2006 by John Michael Eden. 
 1. Extension of the Voting Rights Act, 1975: Hearings on H.R. 939, H.R. 2148, H.R. 3247, 
and H.R. 3501 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. of the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) (statement of Arthur Flemming) (“Section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act, the provision requiring preclearance of changes in electoral laws . . . has become the 
centerpiece of the act.”) (emphasis added). 
 2. See Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 177, 177 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 
1992) (characterizing the Voting Rights Act as “one of the most effective instruments of social 
legislation in the modern era of American reform”); Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the 
Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) 
(manuscript at 1–2, on file with the Duke Law Journal (describing Section 5 as “the most 
powerful weapon in the civil rights arsenal”)). 
 3. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 will expire in 2007 if it is not reauthorized by 
Congress. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1971–1974e (2000)). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
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groups.5 Preclearance can be secured by requesting either a 
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia or administrative preclearance from the 
Department of Justice (DOJ).6 As of 2006, the majority of 
jurisdictions covered by Section 5 are in the Deep South.7 
The primary objective of preclearance is to prevent voting abuses 
in jurisdictions that had a history of discrimination when the VRA 
was enacted. Section 5 was originally enacted for a five-year term. It 
was then reauthorized in 1970 for five additional years,8 in 1975 for a 
term of seven years,9 and again in 1982 for a twenty-five-year term.10 
Though Section 5 was originally intended as a temporary measure, 
successive Congresses perceived reauthorization to be necessary to 
prevent recalcitrant jurisdictions from interfering with the minority 
franchise. 
Yet previous unanimity among voting rights scholars11 has given 
way to heated disagreement over whether Section 5 should be 
reauthorized. Some scholars believe that preclearance may no longer 
be necessary to protect the minority franchise. Professor Issacharoff, 
for instance, contends that Section 5 may no longer be a reasonable 
remedy12 because minority groups are no longer excluded from 
meaningful participation in covered jurisdictions.13 Moreover, the 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Sixteen states or parts thereof are currently covered by Section 5. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. 
at 98–99 (2005). 
 8. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, sec. 3, §4(a), 84 Stat. 314, 
315. 
 9. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, sec. 101, §4(a), 89 Stat. 400, 
400. 
 10. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 2(b)(6)), §4(a), 96 
Stat. 131, 133. 
 11. See Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 2) (“After a long period of relative unanimity, 
the academics who study the Act and the lawyers who enforce it are at an impasse, and they are 
split for reasons that have little to do with whose ox is gored.”). 
 12. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its 
Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (2004). 
 13. See generally id. Professor Issacharoff is not alone in thinking that the political 
influence of African Americans in covered jurisdictions has changed dramatically since the 
Voting Rights Act was initially passed. See Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now At War 
With Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1529 (2002) 
(arguing that “while voting continues to show some degree of racial polarization, the degree of 
polarization nonetheless permits a meaningful level of white–black coalitional politics, and that 
crossover voting enables black candidates in many jurisdictions to be elected even in 
nonmajority–minority districts”). 
03__EDEN.DOC 10/13/2006  8:50 AM 
2006] VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1185 
argument for reauthorization is subject to challenge on federalist 
principles: without a close fit between Section 5 and the obstacles that 
minority groups face in exercising their right to the franchise, 
preclearance violates the principle that state and local enactments are 
presumed lawful “unless and until a federal court rules otherwise.”14 
As Issacharoff colorfully puts it, “Section 5 placed political life in 
[covered] jurisdictions under a form of administrative receivership and 
treated political activity within those areas as subject to a rebuttable 
presumption that the continued exclusion of blacks from meaningful 
political opportunity [is] the dominant feature of all political decision-
making in those jurisdictions.”15 In Issacharoff’s view, preclearance 
unjustifiably relieves covered jurisdictions of political control they 
would otherwise enjoy and also unfairly attributes to those 
jurisdictions a disposition to disenfranchise minority voters. 
Some scholars concede that preclearance in its current guise is 
imperfect. Professor Heather Gerken argues that despite the intrusive 
character of the preclearance process, Section 5 should be 
reauthorized. In her view, preclearance should be reauthorized on an 
opt-in basis.16 The jurisdictions that are currently covered under 
Section 5 would remain “covered,” but in a very specific sense: a 
change to a voting procedure or practice would only require 
preclearance in a covered jurisdiction in cases where local public 
interest and civil rights groups deliberately invoke Section 5 in 
response to a perceived violation of minority voting rights. 
Preclearance, in other words, would be invoked whenever these 
groups felt a particular procedure or practice unlawfully diluted 
minority voting strength or otherwise interfered with the minority 
 
 14. Mark A. Posner, The Politicization of Justice Department Decisionmaking Under 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Is it a Problem and What Should Congress Do? 3 (Jan. 
2006), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Section%205%20decisionmaking%201-30-06.pdf (last visited 
July 9, 2006). It is important to note that Professor Issacharoff never characterizes his own view 
in precisely this way. However, it is clear that in his view special solicitude should only be 
granted when specific rights are genuinely imperiled. See Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1730 
(arguing that the Carolene Products footnote clearly implies that “special solicitude [to minority 
groups] is not simply the product of discreteness, but of the inability to seek redress through the 
normal operations of the political system”). 
 15. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1710 (emphasis added). 
 16. See Heather Gerken, Race (Optional), THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 26, 2005, at 11, 12 
(arguing that instead of reauthorizing Section 5, an opt-in strategy should be adopted that 
“allows community and legislative leaders to negotiate the best deal for racial minorities” but 
which also gives minorities the right “to demand that the Act’s traditional constraints” be 
applied when traditional forms of political bargaining break down), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2005/09/19_gerken.php. 
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franchise. Under this opt-in variant of Section 5, minority voters 
would retain the substantive protections of the traditional 
preclearance mechanism; and covered jurisdictions would enjoy 
greater autonomy over local voting practices and procedures. 
Indulging in a bit of playful rhetoric to drive home this point, Gerken 
insists that an opt-in variant of preclearance would ensure that 
“[p]olitical deals struck by racial minorities would be enforced” 
because “the VRA would hang like the sword of Damocles over 
every negotiation.”17 
There are three easily identifiable positions one might endorse in 
the debate over reauthorization. First, on the basis of political gains 
made since the VRA was originally passed, and in light of the 
significant degree of political interference wrought on covered 
jurisdictions, one could conclude that reauthorization would be a 
mistake. This is the position that Issacharoff advocates. Second, one 
might find an opt-in variant of Section 5 preferable, because in theory 
an opt-in regime would provide minority groups with similar or 
identical levels of protection from voting abuses without subjecting 
“well-behaved” jurisdictions to nettlesome and unnecessary 
administrative review. Essentially, this is Professor Gerken’s solution 
of choice. Finally, it is possible that, notwithstanding the gains in 
political influence that minority groups have made since the Act was 
passed, and despite the undeniable costs of mandatory preclearance, 
Section 5 still provides the most reliable legislative method for 
protecting the integrity of minority voting rights. Call this the 
traditionalist position.18 
The key question this Note addresses is whether Section 5 should 
be reauthorized, and, if so, what form a reauthorized Section 5 should 
take. This Note does not address the numerous constitutional 
concerns posed by a reauthorized Section 5.19 Rather, this Note argues 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Professor Karlan of the Stanford Law School is a traditionalist, for she believes that 
Section 5 has afforded “minority voters and their representatives an invaluable bargaining chip” 
in the struggle to obtain a robust, effective political voice. Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. 
Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L.J. 21, 36 (2004). 
 19. Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that if the current (mandatory) version 
of Section 5 were reauthorized, it could be vulnerable to constitutional challenge. In City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Court held that Congress has the authority to pass 
only remedial statutes when attempting to provide remedies for intentional state action. Id. at 
532. Soon after City of Boerne, the Court held that the constitutionality of such remedial 
statutes turns in large part on whether adequate evidence of intentional state conduct exists to 
justify congressional intervention. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 
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that despite the fact that minorities face fewer and less severe 
obstacles to exercising the franchise than they did when Section 5 was 
originally enacted, there is not enough information about voting 
dynamics in covered jurisdictions to adopt an opt-in variant of 
preclearance. 
Part I of this Note explores Professor Issacharoff’s position. 
Unlike other recent attempts20 to disarm Issacharoff’s carefully 
crafted attack on renewal, this Note argues that when the 
considerations that most affect the desirability of Section 5’s renewal 
are disaggregated and addressed independently, the notion that 
preclearance is undesirable or unnecessary to protect the minority 
franchise becomes significantly less plausible. Part II sketches and 
evaluates Professor Gerken’s argument for adopting an opt-in variant 
of Section 5. The theoretical argument for adopting a modified 
variant of Section 5 is appealing in a number of ways, not the least of 
which is its promise to reduce unnecessary preclearance filings while 
at the same time shifting political bargaining power to civil rights 
groups. Yet the long-term success of an opt-in preclearance 
mechanism would critically depend upon the dedication and 
competence of local public interest and civil rights groups serving 
minority voters. Part III argues that although the opt-in approach is 
appealing in a number of ways, Congress should reauthorize Section 5 
for a period of time that would allow careful study and consideration 
of the probable success of enacting an opt-in approach to 
preclearance. 
 
(2000). It is unclear that City of Boerne and Garrett would be applicable were a constitutional 
challenge mounted to a renewed Section 5. The reason the evidentiary requirements for 
remedial legislation might not apply is that under Nevada Department of Human Resources v. 
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), and Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), broad discretion has 
once again been granted to congressional efforts to craft remedial statutes. The Hibbs Court 
may have made it easier to make the case for preclearance by (1) suggesting that Congress has a 
reduced evidentiary burden when the legitimacy of remedial schemes for gender and racial 
discrimination is called into question and by (2) emphasizing that “Congress may enact so-called 
prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and 
deter unconstitutional conduct.” 538 U.S. at 727–28. In addition to considering the evidence of 
state actors, as is required under Garrett, the Lane Court considered constitutional violations by 
city and county officials. 541 U.S. at 527 n.16. 
 20. See Michael J. Pitts, Let’s Not Call the Whole Thing Off Just Yet: A Response to Samuel 
Issacharoff’s Suggestion to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 NEB. L. REV. 605, 605–
11 (2005) (arguing that in light of Section 5’s role in ensuring that local voting practices do not 
erode minority voting rights, Professor Issacharoff’s complaint that Section 5 is no longer 
needed to ensure the fairness of congressional and statewide redistricting efforts does not 
provide a reason to discard Section 5). 
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I.  THE CASE AGAINST RENEWAL 
The theory of preclearance is in one sense simple: the franchise is 
a critically important right that must be granted to all individuals 
without regard to racial or ethnic extraction. Prior to the Voting 
Rights Act, minority voters in many Southern jurisdictions were not 
able to exercise this right.21 Authorities in many parts of the South 
had even resorted to physical violence and intimidation tactics to 
prevent African Americans from effectively exercising the right to 
vote.22 The franchise—a right explicitly granted to African Americans 
in the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution23—was 
systematically ignored by Southern jurisdictions. To combat the 
attempts of these jurisdictions to nullify a right explicitly granted in 
the Constitution, Congress decided to pass a statute that would 
prevent abuses before they occurred. As the Court observed in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach,24 preclearance was thought necessary to 
“shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the 
evil to its victims.”25 
The simplicity of the theory of preclearance stands in great 
contrast to the difficulties inherent in deciding whether Section 5 is 
still necessary. Section A contrasts the preclearance process with 
Section 2 of the VRA. Section B examines three considerations that 
Issacharoff offers as compelling evidence for the claim that Section 5 
has rendered itself obsolete. 
A. Understanding Preclearance 
To fully appreciate Professor Issacharoff’s argument against 
reauthorization, it is crucial to understand the preclearance process. 
To promote descriptive representation, Section 5 requires 
 
 21. See generally Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 7 (Bernard Groffman & Chandler Davidson eds., 
1992). 
 22. The Attorney General at the time pointed out that in enacting the VRA the federal 
government intended to destroy the obstacles in the way of those African Americans “who 
[wanted] to take the revolutionary step of registering to vote.” Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 
6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 9 (1965) (statement 
of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Att’y Gen. of the United States). 
 23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”). 
 24. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 25. Id. at 328. 
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jurisdictions to submit a wide range of proposed changes to the 
Department of Justice for pre-implementation approval.26 The 
statutory language is exceedingly broad: covered jurisdictions must 
preclear any new “standard, practice or procedure with respect to 
voting.”27 The Supreme Court significantly revised the general 
standard for preclearance with its 2003 decision in Georgia v. 
Ashcroft.28 Frustrated by having its State Senate plan rejected three 
times by the DOJ during the 1990s redistricting cycle, after the 2000 
census Georgia’s legislature decided to file for judicial preclearance 
for its statewide legislative redistricting plan.29 Under this plan, the 
number of majority–minority districts would remain constant, but this 
would be accomplished by “unpacking” the Senate’s majority-black 
districts and distributing the black voters across a wider range of 
districts.30 This plan increased the number of districts with majority 
black populations by one and created four additional districts in 
which blacks comprised between 20 and 50 percent of the voting age 
population.31 Although this redistricting plan passed with the votes of 
ten of eleven black senators, the Voting Section argued that 
unpacking super-majority districts violated black voters’ right to elect 
a candidate of their choice.32 The Court rejected the Voting Section’s 
contention, holding that the creation of coalition districts under these 
circumstances might very well enhance—not undermine—minorities’ 
ability to elect their preferred candidates.33 Under the pre-Ashcroft 
standard, changes in voting practices and procedures could only be 
precleared if it is clear that they could not “lead to a retrogression in 
 
 26. Descriptive representation applies when the party representing a group or interest has 
a number of formal or identifiable characteristics (such as gender or race) in common with that 
group or interest. Thus, the degree to which descriptive representation obtains to a given 
jurisdiction or county is something that rudimentary arithmetic can reveal. Substantive 
representation is more elusive, for it pertains just in case the substantive police preferences of 
party representing a group or interest coincide with the preferences of the represented group or 
interest. See generally HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60–91, 
112–43 (1972) (arguing that although race can in some instances track the policy preferences 
and political orientation of a social or racial group, race is not always, or even usually, an 
accurate proxy and therefore substantive representation is not necessarily ensured by 
descriptive representation).  
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
 28. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
 29. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 31 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 30. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 470–71. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 472. 
 33. Id. at 489–91. 
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the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise 
of the electoral franchise.”34 But Ashcroft effectively supplanted this 
rule with an entirely new standard, one requiring Section 5 reviews to 
include an inquiry into “all the relevant circumstances”35 that might 
impact minority groups’ ability to exercise the right to vote. Thus, 
Ashcroft represents a stunning reversal of Section 5 jurisprudence. 
Unlike Section 2 of the VRA, Section 5 is an administrative 
mechanism that places the burden upon covered jurisdictions to 
prove, before it is implemented, that a particular change is not 
inimical to minority voting interests. Section 2 is a nationwide 
prohibition on the implementation of any practice or procedure that 
diminishes the ability of citizens to elect their chosen representatives 
on the basis of race, color, or membership in a minority language 
group.36 Section 2 suits are difficult for two reasons. First, plaintiffs 
must meet three prerequisites commonly referred to as the “Gingles 
preconditions.”37 These conditions, established in Thornburg v. 
Gingles,38 define vote dilution primarily in terms of the current degree 
of racially polarized voting.39 Second, after the Gingles preconditions 
have been met, Section 2 plaintiffs must further establish that, given 
the particularities of a jurisdiction’s politics,40 the avenues of political 
 
 34. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). 
 35. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 479. 
 36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000) (indicating that a violation of this standard has occurred 
when the totality of circumstances demonstrate that “political processes leading to nomination 
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members 
of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a)” because “its members have less opportunity 
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice”). 
 37. Megann E. Donahue, Note, “The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated”: 
Administering Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act After Georgia v. Ashcroft, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1651, 1654 n.17 (2004). These conditions are as follows: (1) the minority voting-age population 
must be large enough to compose a majority in at least one district; (2) the minority voting-age 
population is politically cohesive; and (3) the white majority in that same district votes with a 
degree of cohesion that allows it to defeat the minority group’s preferred candidate in most 
circumstances. Id. 
 38. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). 
 39. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation 
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1834–35 (1992) (noting that in 
Thornberg, “the Court adopted a simplified test to determine whether white voters as a group 
had frustrated the electoral aspirations of a cohesive set of minority voters and, if so, whether an 
alteration of electoral practices could relieve the diminution of minority electoral opportunity”). 
 40. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011–12 (1994) (noting that “if Gingles so 
clearly identified the three [factors] as generally necessary to prove a § 2 claim, it just as clearly 
declined to hold them sufficient in combination” because “the ultimate conclusions about 
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participation are “not equally open to . . . a class of citizens . . . in that 
its members have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate . . . to elect representatives of their choice.”41 There is an 
additional feature of Section 2 that is worth noting: it does not require 
plaintiffs “to show that the state either enacted or maintained the 
challenged practice because of its discriminatory impact on minority 
voting strength.”42 Notwithstanding the fact that Section 2 plaintiffs 
do not need to establish state action, the practical implication of the 
Gingles preconditions, as well as the totality of the circumstances 
standard, is that Section 2 places a substantial burden on plaintiffs. 
Section 5 review is much different. Rather than shifting the burdens 
of litigation to a complaining party, preclearance requires that 
covered jurisdictions demonstrate ex ante that they are in compliance 
with the VRA.43 
B. Two Arguments Against Renewal 
Professor Issacharoff develops two arguments against 
reauthorizing Section 5. The first focuses on four historical and legal 
“preconditions” that coalesced to make preclearance a reasonable 
remedy for voting rights abuses. These preconditions include: (1) the 
urgency and extent of the harm; (2) the administrative simplicity of 
preclearance; (3) the lack of an effective form of political redress for 
violations of the franchise in the Jim Crow South; and (4) the absence 
of substantial partisan political impact from the preclearance 
process.44 Accordingly, these four preconditions make possible 
Section 5’s effectiveness and attribute to preclearance the legitimacy 
it would otherwise lack.45 
 
equality or inequality of opportunity were intended by Congress to be judgments resting on 
comprehensive, not limited, canvassing of relevant facts”). 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000). 
 42. Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and 
Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 732 (1998). 
 43. See supra notes 4–10 and accompanying text. Section 5 is also advantageous in that it 
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to proscribe changes not only in access to voting 
influence per se, but also to other forms of state regulation that have an impact on the 
effectiveness of the franchise: “The Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the 
obvious, state regulations” because the Act recognizes “that voting includes ‘all action necessary 
to make a vote effective.’” Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565–66 (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(1)). 
 44. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1710. 
 45. See id. at 1712 (“[These] four preconditions allowed this extraordinary intervention to 
work effectively and to retain the clear sense of purpose that permitted it to overcome the 
03__EDEN.DOC 10/13/2006  8:50 AM 
1192 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1183 
Each of these four preconditions can be challenged. With respect 
to the first precondition, the urgency and extent of the harm, one 
could object that it is the responsibility of Congress to decide whether 
the political leverage that minorities derive from Section 5 is 
important enough to justify reauthorization. This is true despite the 
fact that minorities are in a much better position to effect political 
change today than they were when the VRA was initially passed.  
The second precondition, the administrative simplicity of the 
preclearance mechanism, can also be challenged. Drawing on Morris 
v. Gressette46 and Beer v. United States,47 Professor Issacharoff 
contends that in its golden years, Section 5 was applied to “questions 
that could be addressed through relatively mechanical assessments of 
voting practices.”48 Eager to entertain the reader while laying bare an 
important aspect of voting rights history, Issacharoff argues that 
preclearance used to require little more than “sixth-grade 
arithmetic.”49 There is a large measure of truth in this idealization of 
the ease with which pre-Ashcroft preclearance was administered. 
Ashcroft does indeed abandon the ability-to-elect standard Beer 
inaugurated.50 And in so doing, Ashcroft invites courts (1) to 
determine minority groups’ voting power by considering the 
combined strength of minority votes and “like-minded white 
‘crossover’ votes”51 and (2) to consider the “‘extent of the 
opportunities minority voters enjoy to participate in the political 
processes’”52 in evaluating redistricting plans under Section 5. But 
though Ashcroft does extend this invitation to the courts, there is less 
cause for concern than one might initially assume. Although the 
notion of “effective participation in the political process” is somewhat 
vague, perhaps leading to more partisan wrangling,53 there is evidence 
that the DOJ is actually already equipped to handle the nuanced, 
 
normal presumptions of state autonomy and respect for federalism.”). 
 46. Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977). 
 47. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
 48. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1713. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Donahue, supra note 37, at 1662. The ability-to-elect standard was based on the notion 
that a minority group has the right to elect a candidate of choice that will represent its interests 
effectively throughout the political process. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 485 (2003) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 
997 (1994)). 
 53. See Donahue, supra note 37, at 1653 (conceding that “Ashcroft’s call to examine 
substantive representation may cause section 5 review to become increasingly partisan”). 
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fact-specific analyses required under the new, post-Ashcroft Section 
5.54 Insofar as the DOJ is able to conduct meaningful inquiries into 
the circumstances that affect minority voting strength, Professor 
Issacharoff’s argument in this connection is not convincing. After all, 
if the DOJ is capable of administering Section 5 in a way that is 
consistent with Ashcroft, then unless one demonstrates that 
administrative simplicity is so critically important,55 ceteris paribus 
Ashcroft’s nuanced standard appears preferable to its blunter 
predecessor.  
The third precondition is the narrowness of the pre-Ashcroft 
scope of preclearance. On this view, cases like Presley v. Etowah 
County Commission56 “limited the sweep of [S]ection 5 to narrowly 
cover voting practices and to remove questions about the efficacy of 
governance from the ambit of preclearance.”57 As with the second 
precondition, there is nothing in the VRA, or in constitutional 
jurisprudence more generally, that provides a principled reason for 
thinking that Section 5 must apply to a narrow range of electoral 
phenomena. In fairness, it should be noted that Professor 
Issacharoff’s appeal to this principle does not sound in formal 
constitutional jurisprudence, but rather in federalism. But even so, a 
 
 54. See id. at 1676 (“For purposes of evaluating the capacity of the Department [of Justice] 
to conduct the review required by Ashcroft, however, the DOJ’s past practices show a 
particularized, case-by-case, and jurisdiction-specific review is not only possible but also already 
routinely conducted.”). Not only is the DOJ well equipped to conduct fact-specific, contextual 
evaluations of minority voting strength, it should be noted that nowhere in the VRA is there an 
indication that the aims of preclearance can only be achieved through the deployment of 
mechanical, easily-administrable tests, helpful as such metrics may be to analysts at the Voting 
Section. 
 55. Professor Issacharoff has simply not demonstrated that this is true. It could be argued 
that clear, mechanical guidelines are particularly important in the context of voting rights 
because they make it more difficult to dilute minority voting strength.  
Professor Issacharoff does not directly make this argument or even hint at it. Professor 
Karlan, however, offers an argument very similar to this. Karlan contends that Ashcroft’s plastic 
standard not only fails to provide a reliable way to appropriately weigh the actual effects of 
diluted minority voting power, it also fails to provide courts with a framework for evaluating the 
real empirical effects of a redistricting plan on minority voting strength. As Professor Karlan 
colorfully puts this point, Ashcroft supplants serious inquiry about the effects of redistricting on 
minority political influence with a “free floating inquiry into legislative intent.” Karlan, supra 
note 18, at 35.  
 56. 502 U.S. 491, 506 (1992) (holding that Section 5 review only applies to voting practices 
and does not apply to difficult questions concerning the efficacy of local governance; as the 
Court explained, “[c]hanges which affect only the distribution of power among officials are not 
subject to § 5 because such changes have no direct relation to, or impact on, voting”). 
 57. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1713. 
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careful reading of Is Section 5 a Victim of Its Own Success?58 reveals 
that the federalist intuitions that drive the argument are never 
explored in a way that effectively demonstrates why federalism 
requires that Section 5 be easily administered and narrow in scope.59 
The fourth and final precondition concerns the specific character 
of political competition in the covered jurisdictions when the VRA 
was originally enacted. Though not alone in recognizing the 
substantial impact of voting rights law on partisan politics,60 Professor 
Issacharoff observes that Section 5 produces more readily justifiable 
outcomes when there is a dearth of healthy political competition in 
covered jurisdictions: “In paradoxical fashion, the more Southern 
politics continued to be organized around the retrograde isolation 
and suppression of black political interests, the more enlightened and 
noble would be the intervention from Washington.”61 Intervention 
from the DOJ in Washington would forcibly erode the “encrusted 
white establishment of the Democratic Party,”62 thus undermining 
racial homogeneity in Southern politics but doing nothing to entrench 
partisan interests in covered jurisdictions. The bugbear, then, is that 
“the use of preclearance for districting configurations . . . dramatically 
increases the ability to use preclearance to affect the projected 
outcomes in terms of partisan representation.”63 
It is difficult to muster sympathy for this argument. It begins with 
the assumption that African Americans and other minority groups 
find it more beneficial to vote for Democratic candidates. In a post-
Ashcroft world, the DOJ will preclear redistricting plans that unpack 
minority voters, thus allowing for the creation of coalition districts in 
 
 58. See supra note 12. 
 59. There is a rich literature in anti-discrimination theory that could have been consulted to 
articulate the federalist pedigree of the second and third preconditions. See, e.g., Robert C. Post 
& Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After 
Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 444 (2000) (“Supreme Court decisions . . . have brought 
Congress’s power to enact antidiscrimination legislation under Section 5 to the top of the 
judicial agenda, while simultaneously rendering doubtful the nature and extent of Congress’s 
authority to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 60. Scholars have long recognized that the enactment of the Voting Rights Act has had 
considerable effects on partisan politics. See, e.g., NELSON W. POLSBY, HOW CONGRESS 
EVOLVES: SOCIAL BASES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 80 (2004) (“The registration of black 
voters [following the Voting Rights Act of 1965] strengthened the liberal factions of the 
Democratic parties in the several states and encouraged conservative voters and leaders to 
desert the Democrats and become Republicans.”). 
 61. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1713–14. 
 62. Id. at 1713. 
 63. Id. at 1730–31. 
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covered jurisdictions. Coalition districts are widely thought to 
increase the probability of widespread gains for the Democratic 
Party. In this way, a reauthorized Section 5 would become one of the 
most powerful strategic weapons in the Democratic Party’s arsenal. It 
is important to note that this argument is probably meant to apply to 
post-Ashcroft preclearance. Pre-Ashcroft preclearance was not 
solicitous of the creation of coalition districts, and thus it was 
common to create majority–minority districts, which allowed racial 
minorities to constitute the majority during elections. Under these 
circumstances, many Democrats felt that where African American 
and Latino populations were relatively small in absolute terms, too 
many seats would be lost to Republicans. As Professor Gerken 
explains, “[s]ome even blame the Democrats’ loss of the House on 
the aggressive creation of majority–minority districts during the 
1990s, a trend spurred in part by section 5.”64 
In any event, in a post-Ashcroft world the claim that Section 5 
would become an instrument of partisan politics only makes sense if 
one assumes that the voting preferences of minority groups should be 
equitably distributed across the existing dominant political parties. 
But what could possibly justify such an assumption? The conditions 
that affect and condition competition between political parties—the 
parties’ relative sensitivity to constituents’ needs, appeal to a wide 
voting base, and willingness to represent a diversity of interests—are 
to a large extent within the control of the parties themselves. Failing 
to win the support of a particular constituency is just that—a failure of 
a particular political party. Though Section 5 may indeed bring into 
sharp relief a political party’s systematic failure to capture the 
imaginations and trust of certain minority groups, preclearance does 
not cause that systematic failure. 
To be sure, there is an obvious riposte to this criticism. Professor 
Issacharoff points out that the Ashcroft Court was more than willing 
to “consider that black electoral prospects in Georgia could not be 
divorced from . . . partisan battles for legislative hegemony.”65 This is 
an interesting development in voting rights jurisprudence, as it 
suggests that there are a number of “front-burner” political 
decisions—such as redistricting—for which Section 5 produces 
partisan results by proxy. In remaining too solicitous of minority 
 
 64. See Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 7 n.20) (“Neither Pildes nor Issacharoff has 
firmly committed to the view that section 5 ought to expire in 2007.”). 
 65. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1730. 
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political interests, preclearance lends the color of law to what is 
essentially partisan spoils. But again, this is exactly the same non 
sequitur sketched above: it erroneously insists that Section 5 is the 
cause of the preferences that minority groups have for particular 
political parties. 
The second argument against preclearance is that it may no 
longer be necessary to protect the minority franchise.66 In fact, Section 
5 may stand in the way of the political compromises that appear to be 
available to minority voters in the twenty-first century. To be sure, 
there are a number of reasons to find this argument compelling. 
There are no longer “the poll taxes, the literacy tests, and the other 
overt barriers to voter registration”;67 “[b]latant and despicable 
discrimination no longer occurs on the widespread level at which it 
occurred four decades ago”;68 and higher numbers of minority 
representatives appear in substantial numbers in Congress, state 
legislatures, and in local political positions.69 
But it is unclear what these changes in the relative political 
power and influence of minority voters mean for the reauthorization 
debate. Are minorities strong enough to stand on their own, to 
negotiate political deals without the aid of preclearance? It is possible 
that Section 5 no longer plays a crucial role in national politics, but 
still provides critical protection for minority candidates at the local 
level.70 It is also possible that Section 5 is necessary both to protect 
 
 66. See id. at 1728 (observing that Section 5, in its current guise, “appears to hamper the 
very type of coalitional politics that traditional defenders of minority voting rights” have 
historically endorsed). 
 67. Issacharoff, supra note 39, at 1833–34 (footnotes omitted).  
 68. Pitts, supra note 20, at 606–07. 
 69. See DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. FOR POL. AND ECON. STUD., BLACK ELECTED 
OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 2000, at 5 (2002), available at http://www.jointcenter.org/ 
publications1/publication-PDFs/BEO-pdfs/BEO-00.pdf (observing that political officials of 
African American descent numbered 9,040 in 2000, whereas a study published in 1968 found 
there were only 1,469 black representatives); Kim Geron & James S. Lai, Beyond Symbolic 
Representation: A Comparison of the Electoral Pathways and Policy Priorities of Asian 
American and Latino Elected Officials, 9 ASIAN L.J. 41, 49 (2002) (chronicling a similarly modest 
increase in the number of Asian-American elected officials from 1978 (120) to 2000 (309)); 
National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials Educational Fund, 
http://www.naleo.org/membership.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006) (chronicling a more modest 
increase in the number of Latino elected officials from 1984 (3,128) to 2004 (4,853)).  
 70. See Pitts, supra note 20, at 630 (“While minority voters may now be powerful enough 
on a statewide level to protect their own interests without having the watchful eye of federal 
officials in Washington in their corner, it is not nearly as clear that minority voters have this 
same power on the local level.”). 
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national and local politics.71 Given Professor Issacharoff’s concession 
that the empirical evidence available on the level of political power 
minorities would possess independent of Section 5 is equivocal,72 
some degree of risk aversion seems justifiable.73 Put another way, if 
there is little reason to confidently believe that minorities can stand on 
their own feet,74 unaided by the crutches provided by Section 5, does 
this necessarily mean that Section 5 should be reauthorized in its 
mandatory form? This question is addressed in Part II. 
II.  AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION: DYNAMIC COMPLIANCE 
A number of scholars agree that preclearance has “achieved 
spectacular results.”75 But many are concerned that if Section 5 is 
renewed in its mandatory guise, it will not only fail to adequately 
protect minority interests,76 it will also in some circumstances actively 
frustrate those interests.77 Professor Gerken has provided the most 
comprehensive and promising alternative solution: an opt-in 
 
 71. See Karlan, supra note 18, at 36 (suggesting that because minority gains have been 
achieved through bargaining “in the shadow of” preclearance, it is possible that preserving 
minority voting influence in the future requires retaining Section 5). 
 72. See Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1729 (“Much in this debate turns on a difficult 
empirical assessment of when minorities become full players in the political process.”). 
 73. However, Professor Issacharoff is not opposed to taking seriously the possibility that 
minorities might lose political influence in a Section 5-free world. But he does insist that the 
decision to reauthorize cannot be predicated exclusively upon an unreasonable policy against 
taking risks. Cf. id. at 1731 (“If the burden for change is certainty of outcome, then the status 
quo always prevails. . . .[T]he combination of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the protections 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fact of being in the process and at the table would 
afford much protection.”). 
 74. As Professor Gerken explains, “[i]t is extraordinarily difficult to decide whether 
entrenched racial politics persist or whether we have reached ‘normal politics’ because we 
cannot assess the extent to which the threat of a VRA lawsuit has affected political bargaining 
in this country.” Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 8); see also Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the 
Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
503, 533 (arguing that it is virtually impossible to measure the political power of minority groups 
independently of the bargaining leverage preclearance provides). 
 75. Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 3). 
 76. See generally CAROL SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS (1995) (arguing that 
white-black racial coalitions are not only necessary to serve the political, economic and social 
needs of the black community, these coalitions can actually be effective in promoting the 
interests of African Americans); Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority–Minority Districts 
Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794 (1996); 
Gerken, supra note 2. 
 77. See Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1729 (arguing that mandatory preclearance “could 
compromise the range of political accords available to minority voters and thereby, under 
conditions of mature political engagement, actually thwart minority political gains”). 
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approach whereby “community representatives, public interest 
groups, and other parts of civil society”78 can actuate the requirements 
of Section 5 in the event that political bargaining breaks down. The 
primary objective of this approach is to encourage dynamic 
compliance with voting rights laws: because public interest and civil 
rights groups are charged with informing the DOJ of voting rights 
abuses, local political bargaining can achieve an equilibrium without 
mandatory interference from Washington. This is what makes 
compliance under an opt-in scheme dynamic. 
The general appeal of Professor Gerken’s opt-in solution is that 
it appears to promote efficient political bargaining while 
simultaneously providing a robust form of protection for minorities 
who find themselves unable to exercise the franchise in a meaningful 
way.79 Section A describes the role of civil rights groups in 
encouraging fair and efficient bargaining and Section B describes the 
potential for enhanced political participation under an opt-in scheme. 
The purpose of this Part is primarily descriptive. 
A. Encouraging Efficient and Fair Political Bargaining 
The principal objective of an opt-in version of Section 5 is to 
encourage efficient and fair political bargaining without imposing 
unreasonable administrative burdens on jurisdictions that are not 
actually interfering with minority groups’ effective enjoyment of the 
franchise. According to Professor Gerken, an opt-in scheme “would 
give community members a chance to bargain with localities over 
voting rights enforcement while providing them with a meaningful 
alternative should bargaining fail.”80 The opportunity to bargain 
would be secured by the ability of public interest groups and civil 
rights organizations to call upon the DOJ to impose Section 5’s 
requirements. Essentially, the opt-in approach vests the authority to 
trigger a Section 5 analysis in the people closest to the action—
namely, the public interest and civil rights groups most concerned 
with the local political dynamics that color minority groups’ ability to 
strike political bargains responsive to their interests. 
 
 78. Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 9). 
 79. As Professor Gerken aptly puts this second point, an opt-in scheme would “avoid the 
dangers associated with full-scale regulatory retreat by providing a safety net for racial 
minorities who find themselves negotiating a hostile political environment.” Id. (manuscript at 
9). 
 80. Id. (manuscript at 2). 
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Professor Gerken’s opt-in approach is predicated upon 
“responsive regulation,” an approach that has proved successful 
across a range of regulatory areas, including environmental law, 
welfare regulation, employment law, and consumer safety.81 
Responsive regulation involves three elements. First, there is the 
element of sunshine: the law must provide equal access to the 
information that is necessary to make political choices or formulate 
policy preferences.82 Second, there is the element of escalation: the 
law must vest authority in the relevant agency or agencies to impose a 
system of incentives that involves both rewards and punishments; so 
as to “tailor the level of government intervention to whether the 
regulated party functions as a good actor or bad actor within the 
system.”83 And third, there is the element of tripartism: the legal 
system must enlist the assistance of third-parties—public interest 
groups, civil rights activists, and other whistleblowers—to determine 
when regulatory or disciplinary action must be taken against a bad 
actor.84 In short, responsive regulation works best when local 
community members communicate effectively with the appropriate 
government agency so as to reduce the agency’s monitoring costs and 
at the same time increase the degree to which it can sanction unlawful 
conduct.85 
The theory behind responsive regulation is that if access to 
relevant information is guaranteed, and if agencies deploy a mix of 
rewards and punishment in a way commensurate with the complying 
or offending party’s conduct, then “collaborative negotiation may 
produce better regulatory outcomes than top-down regulation.”86 It 
should be noted that this theory assumes that the entities that are 
granted access to relevant information—local public interest groups 
and civil rights organizations, for example—have sufficiently stable 
incentives to utilize the information to engage in meaningful 
monitoring of potential bad actors. Though the assumption that civil 
 
 81. Professor Gerken’s work is influenced by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite’s early work 
on responsive regulation. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992). 
 82. Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 4). 
 83. Id. (manuscript at 12). 
 84. Id. 
 85. I have deliberately avoided framing responsive regulation in game theoretic terms. But 
see AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 81, at 60–71 (setting out a game-theoretic model of 
regulation). 
 86. Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 12). 
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rights organizations do possess such incentives to some degree is 
eminently reasonable, scant evidence exists for the more salient—and 
less reasonable—assumption that most civil rights groups and other 
interested parties have sufficient incentives to meet this charge. 
Does this theory hold in the context of voting rights? Perhaps. 
Professor Gerken frankly admits that it may not be possible to 
replicate the success of responsive regulation in the context of voting 
rights;87 however, she notes that the kind of negotiation that 
responsive regulation encourages is in fact already occurring in the 
world of election law. Two aspects of the current regulatory approach 
support this claim. First, the DOJ already culls and analyzes 
information from representatives of minority groups in administering 
Section 5. In fact, the DOJ has developed a diverse and complex set 
of customary procedures for initially vetting preclearance requests 
from covered jurisdictions. For example, there is a minimal or 
“quick” review, primarily utilized in jurisdictions with a small 
minority population or in places where racial minorities already 
“dominate politics.”88 The existence of this pre-existing practice 
strongly suggests that if civil rights groups were to take a more 
proactive role in collecting and sharing information, the DOJ would 
readily be able to sort through and weigh such information. In 
Gerken’s view, since the DOJ is already employing a wide variety of 
screening mechanisms for different kinds of jurisdictions, an opt-in 
Section 5 would reflect and reinforce practices that have already 
taken root in the Voting Section. Second, Ashcroft’s “totality of the 
circumstances” test requires the DOJ to continue collecting and 
sifting through such information. 
Despite this palpable symmetry between existing preclearance 
review procedures and the theory of responsive regulation, there is a 
very general reason one might remain skeptical of the claim that an 
opt-in variant of Section 5 would result in increased efficiency in 
political bargaining. An opt-in scheme can only encourage political 
bargaining beyond what the mandatory preclearance regime incents if 
community members are afforded additional reasons to share 
relevant information with the DOJ. Yet if Professor Gerken is right 
 
 87. See id. (manuscript at 13) (“There is, of course, a danger that the successes of other 
models cannot be reproduced in the election law context without a good deal more mimicry 
than proposed here.”). 
 88. Professor Gerken learned of these practices through interviewing a number of officials 
at the Voting Section of the DOJ. See id. (manuscript at 16–17 n.52). 
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that the most significant difference between opt-in and mandatory 
preclearance is that “members of the relevant community [get to] 
decide for themselves what is worth investigating and what is not,”89 
then there would seem to be no additional reasons to proactively 
share information with the DOJ. After all, by hypothesis an opt-in 
scheme would allow public interest groups and civil rights 
organizations to do officially what they have been doing informally.90 
What additional incentive could there be? 
It is possible that under an opt-in system civil rights groups 
would be more likely to share particularly salient information about 
potential abuses. Although this outcome is within the bounds of 
reason, it is problematic. The claim that bargaining would be 
enhanced is problematic if one grants Professor Gerken’s (implicit) 
prediction that under an opt-in regime minority representatives 
would much more frequently enter the fray in order to protect and 
advocate minority groups’ respective interests. In other words, if one 
assumes that civil rights groups will prove ardent advocates, then it is 
difficult to see how political bargaining would necessarily be 
enhanced. It is reasonable to assume that the quantity of bargaining 
would increase at the margins. But if the substantive standards 
applied to changes in voting practices and procedures were carried 
over from mandatory preclearance,91 then in the aggregate one would 
expect very similar outcomes—not necessarily a substantive change in 
the nature, quality or efficiency of political bargaining. 
Nevertheless, Professor Gerken’s view has two important 
features that partially quell these concerns. First, though an opt-in 
approach may not result in more efficient political bargaining, an opt-
in system would distribute the responsibility for ensuring that 
minority voices are heard across civil rights groups, public interest 
groups, and the states. As Gerken observes, the opt-in approach 
 
 89. Id. (manuscript at 18). 
 90. Id. (manuscript at 17) (“One might worry that civil rights groups lack the resources to 
play such an important role in enforcing the right to vote. But they are already doing the type of 
legwork needed for an opt-in approach to work.”). 
 91. On the one hand, it appears that Professor Gerken has not settled on a specific set of 
remedies, implying that the opt-in approach she recommends is compatible with a wide range of 
remedies—even remedies that local minority representatives could finesse to fit the empirical 
real-world circumstances at issue. On the other hand, Gerken clearly believes that a defensible 
opt-in approach should utilize the totality of the circumstances approach endorsed by the 
Ashcroft Court. See id. (manuscript at 32) (arguing that a “flexible regulatory strategy” allowing 
Section 2 and Section 5’s remedies to be applied as circumstances require would “help us exit 
the current morass we now face in choosing which districting strategy is the better one”). 
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“would require states and minority voters to share the risk of mistake, 
placing a formal obligation on racial minorities to participate in the 
enforcement process while still guaranteeing them the basic safety net 
section 5 currently provides.”92 Second, minority representatives 
would be able to influence electoral policy at two different stages of 
the preclearance process. Not only would such representatives be 
charged with sharing salient information and requesting preclearance 
investigations, they would also have a chance to challenge the DOJ’s 
preclearance decisions. Gerken is probably right that the increasingly 
politicized nature of preclearance makes it imperative to adopt 
procedures for policing the DOJ.93 To be sure, one might worry that 
providing civil rights groups with the right to challenge preclearance 
decisions is a bad idea. In a post-Ashcroft world, a world in which 
courts and the DOJ must examine a preclearance request in light of 
the totality of the circumstances, there is an exceedingly large margin 
for error (depending of course on one’s perspective). Without the 
benefit of a readily administrable retrogression standard—a standard 
condemning redistricting plans resulting in quantifiable 
retrogression—post-preclearance litigation could very well rise to 
unacceptable levels. 
B. Providing Incentives for Political Engagement 
Perhaps the most promising aspect of Professor Gerken’s opt-in 
proposal is its emphasis on encouraging political participation. As 
previously noted, the opt-in system that Gerken envisions would 
more equitably distribute the responsibility for regulating the political 
process between minority group agents and the states. 
The opt-in approach would accomplish this objective in two 
ways. First, in allocating to local public interest groups and civil rights 
organizations the formal obligation to police the political process, the 
opt-in approach thereby privileges “local knowledge and community 
participation in protecting the right to vote.”94 Armed with 
information about a proposed change to a voting practice or 
procedure, civil rights groups would be able to make decisions about 
which investigations to initiate on the basis of the “local motives and 
 
 92. Id. (manuscript at 9). 
 93. See Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 10) (“It is thus time to take another lesson 
from the administrative law playbook and treat DOJ decisions as one would the decisions of any 
other federal agency by allowing third parties to challenge them in court.”). 
 94. Id. (manuscript at 15). 
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electoral consequences that DOJ officials cannot possibly hope to 
possess.”95 
Second, the opt-in approach creates a very dynamic set of 
incentives that would benefit minority groups and the larger political 
process. Minority group agents would be responsible for asking the 
DOJ to initiate an investigation in the event that a minority group 
lacked the political leverage necessary to secure a fair and equitable 
political compromise. Localities would have a palpable incentive to 
cooperate with civil rights groups, because under an opt-in scheme, 
the DOJ would very likely ramp-up its current practice of looking 
more carefully at “potentially troubling requests coming from 
localities against whom a large number of information requests or 
objections were made.”96 Even localities with a significant history of 
responsiveness to the special needs of minority voters would have an 
incentive to negotiate thoughtfully with minority agents; as Professor 
Gerken explains, “because a civil rights complaint accusing the 
locality of malfeasance has a different normative significance than the 
run-of-the-mill preclearance request that [under the mandatory 
variant of Section 5] every covered jurisdiction files for each change it 
makes.”97 
III.  THE WISDOM OF REAUTHORIZING SECTION 5 
Part I addressed two stiff challenges to mandatory preclearance. 
Part II evaluated the opt-in approach to preclearance, concluding that 
this new form of preclearance would be desirable if it lived up to its 
theoretical promise. This third and final Part examines in a more 
direct fashion the potential problems with the opt-in approach. 
Section A addresses these potential problems. In addition, Section B 
considers what steps Congress should take to gather the information 
necessary to fully evaluate an opt-in approach. I conclude that unless 
Congress is prepared to gamble with the minority franchise by 
allowing preclearance to expire, Section 5 (in its mandatory form) 
should be extended for a period of time necessary to allow Congress 
 
 95. Id. (manuscript at 18). According to Professor Gerken, something very much like this is 
already happening. See id. (manuscript at 19) (“At least as a formal matter, the current 
regulatory scheme treats racial minorities as passive wards of the DOJ. That formal allocation 
is, of course, belied by the active role that community group members already play behind the 
scenes in helping the DOJ.”). 
 96. Id. (manuscript at 20 n.66). 
 97. Id. (manuscript at 20). 
03__EDEN.DOC 10/13/2006  8:50 AM 
1204 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1183 
to evaluate the potential virtues and limitations of the opt-in 
approach. 
A. Adopting an Opt-in Approach Is Premature 
The general aim of opt-in preclearance is to “create a set of 
institutional incentives and decisionmaking proxies that would induce 
cooperation between localities and community leaders and focus 
enforcement resources on bad actors.”98 It is difficult to foresee 
whether this lofty goal would be realized under an opt-in regime for a 
number of interlocking reasons. 
First, the question one should ask in evaluating the promise of 
opt-in preclearance is whether it leads to acceptable levels of 
protection for minority voting rights. In the wake of Ashcroft, the 
notion of acceptable levels of protection is exceedingly difficult to 
define. For those who believe that Ashcroft was rightly decided, there 
is no rule of thumb: as long as minorities are able to meaningfully 
participate in the political process, a locality has not illegally 
interfered with the minority franchise. Insofar as an opt-in variant of 
Section 5 would produce the same or similar substantive results that 
this standard would under the existing mandatory scheme, opt-in by 
definition produces “acceptable” levels of protection. For those who 
think Ashcroft was a mistake,99 the promise of opt-in preclearance is 
hard to divine. On the one hand, it is possible that the civil rights 
groups in some jurisdictions would wield the threat of opt-in 
preclearance adroitly, forcing localities otherwise hostile to their 
claims to make concessions hitherto regarded impossible to attain. On 
the other, it is equally possible that civil rights groups will in many 
instances fail to protect minority interests, leading to a situation in 
which Ashcroft’s already dubious standard is further watered down. 
This would be, as it were, a triple retrogression: If Professor Karlan is 
right to characterize Ashcroft as a retrogression (i.e., an erosion) of 
the original retrogression standards developed in Beer, then an opt-in 
 
 98. Id. (manuscript at 9). 
 99. See Karlan, supra note 18, at 36 (“It is as true with respect to political institutions as it 
was with respect to public schools, that ‘[o]ne swallow does not make a spring.’ Our long, bitter, 
and all-too-recent history of covered jurisdictions’ pervasive indifference and hostility to 
minority citizens’ political aspirations demands something more than the triumph of hope over 
experience. Gutting section 5, as the Supreme Court seemed poised to do in Georgia v. 
Ashcroft, is itself a retrogression in minority voters’ effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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system implemented by sporadically-competent and incompetent civil 
rights groups would certainly fit this description. 
The second problem in evaluating the promise of opt-in 
preclearance is intimately related to the first: there are difficult 
empirical questions about whether civil rights groups across a range 
of jurisdictions will be capable of and committed to monitoring 
localities for voting rights abuses. Professor Gerken is well aware that 
there are doubts about the ability of these groups to monitor reliably 
such abuses, but points out that local chapters of the NAACP, the 
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), 
and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) are 
already playing a very active role in policing local voting abuses.100 In 
making this connection, Gerken argues that if these groups are given 
wide access to information (reflecting the sunshine aspect of the 
responsive regulation model), the resource limitations constraining 
some of these groups would be greatly alleviated.101 
Still, little empirical inquiry has been undertaken to ascertain the 
general level of competence of local civil rights groups in identifying 
voting rights abuses. This suggests that even though the “distant 
bureaucrats” may not be perfectly able to administer preclearance, 
the Voting Section will be more than marginally effective in 
protecting the voting franchise in the near future. Given the dearth of 
data available, at this point the same cannot be said about a system 
that is driven exclusively by the earnest commitment of civil rights 
organizations.102 When comparing mandatory and opt-in preclearance, 
great care should be taken before transitioning to a new scheme 
where the costs and benefits are a matter of well-informed guesswork. 
It may very well be that a number of civil rights organizations are up 
to the task. But it may also be true that in a number of jurisdictions, 
 
 100. Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 17–18). 
 101. See id. (manuscript at 18) (explaining that “the sunshine provisions of this proposal 
might even ease the burden already shouldered by these groups by providing them a readily 
accessible means for identifying violations and pooling information” and observing that such a 
proposal “would provide a more transparent process for public interest groups and minority 
officials taking part in enforcement, one that makes public the role that community leaders now 
play privately in the enforcement process”). 
 102. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Groups, Politics, and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 35, 44–45 (2003) (“By the post-1990 round of redistricting, blacks 
and Hispanics had progressed from being literally locked out of the room in which political 
deals were cut to being key members of state legislative redistricting committees.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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the organizations that exist are poorly equipped for the significant 
responsibility an opt-in system would foist upon them. 
Third, there are opportunities for fraud in an opt-in system. For 
instance, shell agencies could be constructed to fraudulently 
“represent” the interests of minority voters. Professor Gerken 
acknowledges that fraud may play a larger role in an opt-in system 
than in a mandatory regime. In her view, one should even expect 
“political parties to try to capture existing community groups and to 
fake the appearance of a healthy decisionmaking process.”103 
Notwithstanding the opportunities for fraud that an opt-in system 
would create, Gerken insists that on balance it would be preferable to 
allow (legitimate) community leaders to play a formal role in leading 
their constituencies. On this view, it would be better to “channel our 
political and litigation energies into discerning what members of the 
minority community actually think about the question” rather than 
allow “scholars or politicians [to] play the role of philosopher king, 
opining about what is best for the minority community.”104 
In light of these potential problems with an opt-in preclearance 
regime, Congress should avoid adopting this variant of Section 5 until 
more is known about its effectiveness in protecting the minority 
franchise over the long term. The next section addresses four 
inquiries that need to be undertaken before an opt-in regime should 
be implemented. 
B. Building a Case for Dynamic Compliance 
1. The Expected Utility of Opt-in Preclearance.  In evaluating 
the effectiveness of the opt-in approach, Congress should undertake 
four related inquiries. First, Congress should consider carefully 
whether opt-in preclearance is likely to be effective in the voting 
rights context. One way of doing this is to consider the relevance of 
theories of responsive regulation105 (or dynamic compliance) to voting 
rights as carefully as possible.106 This is necessary for a simple reason: 
 
 103. Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 30). 
 104. Id. (manuscript at 30–31). 
 105. See supra notes 81–92 and accompanying text. 
 106. There is a substantial literature on the impact of “responsive regulation” in the 
workplace and in governing the behavior of public officials in a variety of regulatory contexts. 
See generally Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public 
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opt-in regulatory strategies may be very effective in some regulatory 
domains, but unhelpful in others. In some regulatory domains, 
individuals have strong incentives to engage in monitoring with an 
eye to increasing compliance with a set of legal principles or norms; in 
others, these incentives are not very strong. For instance, in the 
context of tort law, private firms bear the costs associated with 
damage awards.107 In a sense, individuals play a “monitoring” role in 
the tort context because they bring suits against private firms who 
violate legal norms. Because firms directly shoulder the costs of tort 
regulation, individuals have relatively strong incentives to press for 
enforcement.108 The government plays a regulatory role by providing 
a set of substantive laws under which individuals can recover, but 
individuals play a critical monitoring role because they decide when a 
violation of those laws is serious enough to pursue enforcement. 
As Professor Gerken herself recognizes, the same cannot be said 
of individuals in the context of voting rights.109 For in this context, 
elected officials do not “bear the costs of regulation in the same way 
that private firms do.”110 Elected officials may be forced to revise a 
redistricting plan or abandon a particular voting practice, but they are 
not forced to internalize the costs associated with penalties for 
noncompliance. Moreover, individuals are not wronged in the tort 
context in precisely the way they are wronged in the context of voting 
rights. If a tort has been committed, an individual citizen is directly 
harmed by the activity of a particular firm (or individual). Yet to be 
deprived of the ability to select a candidate of one’s choice is a 
collective harm. This is not to deny that individual minority voters are 
in an important sense harmed by these violations. But minority voters 
are harmed as a class because it is the interests of similarly situated 
citizens that are compromised when Section 5 is violated. 
From this observation it need not follow that individual minority 
voters have particularly weak incentives to press for enforcement of 
voting rights regulations. But given that elected officials—the 
 
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation 
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). 
 107. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 13–14 n.43) (“In voting rights enforcement, 
there may be a broader range of players who can play that monitoring role . . . .”). 
 110. Id. (manuscript at 13 n.43). 
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“regulated entities” in election law111—do not “directly bear the costs” 
of noncompliance with voting rights law,112 placing the responsibility 
to monitor compliance in community representatives may not be a 
good idea. Even if individuals and the groups that represent them 
theoretically have incentives to actively monitor undesirable conduct, 
Congress should have a better idea of how similar, or dissimilar, 
enforcement patterns would be before adopting opt-in 
preclearance.113 The problem, of course, is that a number of what can 
loosely be called “cooperative” enforcement schemes—i.e., schemes 
like tort law which involve private monitoring by individuals and 
public enforcement by courts—provide optimistic estimates of the 
success of opt-in enforcement that may prove false in the context of 
election law. Thus, a number of factors affect the effectiveness of 
“private” monitoring: the ability of individuals or groups to 
effectively gather relevant information, the ease and effectiveness of 
using that information in bargaining, and the strength of the 
incentives that institutions have for complying with either informal 
demands, or, as the case may be, with demands issued by legal 
institutions when bargaining has failed. The impact of each of these 
factors is not necessarily illuminated by the theory and practice of 
responsive regulation. 
Congress should try to determine whether the flexibility an opt-
in approach promises is really in the interests of minority groups. A 
good place to begin is the movement toward self-regulatory regimes 
in the workplace.114 Modern employers, dismayed by the average costs 
associated with employment litigation, have decided to adopt 
diversity programs, internal dispute resolution processes, and 
mandatory arbitration.115 For example, in an effort to preempt sexual 
harassment litigation, some employers have adopted antiharassment 
policies that proscribe a wide range of offensive communication in the 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. The enforcement of voting rights only rarely results in fines or imprisonment. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1973j (2000). 
 113. Professor Gerken suggests that “asking community leaders to take part in the 
enforcement process may give members of these communities a greater sense of efficacy and 
ownership over the enforcement process.” Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 18). 
 114. See generally Estlund, supra note 106 (analyzing the impact of “responsive regulation” 
in the workplace and in governing the behavior of public officials in a variety of regulatory 
contexts). 
 115. Id. at 333. 
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workplace.116 To enforce such policies, employers might provide 
employees with an accessible, simple procedure for reporting 
violations. In this way, some forms of workplace regulation involve 
cooperation among employers and employees where once federal 
administrative agencies were primarily responsible for securing 
workers’ rights.117 
This form of cooperation in the workplace is sometimes criticized 
on the ground that the “compliance” it ultimately produces is illusory 
or cosmetic.118 The core complaint of self-regulatory schemes in the 
workplace is not that internal compliance mechanisms inevitably fail 
to protect the interests of the workers they are designed to shepherd. 
Rather, the claim is that little empirical evidence exists to support the 
claim that self-regulation schemes actually do deter unlawful conduct 
within the modern workplace.119 Structurally speaking, these 
monitoring schemes are very much like what would be deployed in an 
opt-in variant of preclearance. And so, it is natural to consider the 
possibility that the opt-in approach to Section 5 might be a dubious 
mode of deterring wrongful conduct.120 However, the analogy 
between self-regulation in the workplace and opt-in preclearance 
need not be perfect to be apropos: before adopting an entirely new 
version of preclearance, Congress should have reasonable grounds for 
 
 116. Id. at 334. 
 117. See id. at 324 (“The coordination of internal or self-regulatory compliance structures 
with the external law of the workplace has the potential to create new mechanisms for the 
enforcement of employee rights and labor standards—mechanisms that engage employees and 
revive the prospects for employer voice in the wake of declining unionization.”). 
 118. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003). But cf. Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in 
the Twenty-First Century Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
639 (1998) (suggesting that self-regulatory strategies can work in tandem with external legal 
restrictions to thwart discrimination in the workplace). 
 119. See Krawiec, supra note 118 at 491 (stating that “a growing body of evidence indicates 
that internal compliance structures do not deter prohibited conduct within firms, and may 
largely serve a window-dressing function that provides both market legitimacy and reduced 
legal liability”). 
 120. Professor Gerken argues that deterrence would actually be enhanced in an opt-in 
scheme. She assumes that courts evaluating preclearance requests under an opt-in regime would 
look for indicia that a political bargain was struck fairly as a procedural matter. On the basis of 
this assumption Gerken infers that because participation of minority representatives in a 
political bargain would be viewed as a proxy for fairness by any reviewing court, political elites 
would “finally have a reason to engage with the communities affected by the decisions they 
make.” Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 24). 
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believing that voting rights abuses will not be under-deterred relative 
to mandatory preclearance.121  
2. Measuring the Monitoring Capacity of Civil Rights 
Organizations.  Second, Congress should collect as much data as 
possible on the capacity of local public interest and civil rights groups 
to monitor voting abuses. As noted previously,122 Professor Gerken 
argues that local chapters of the NAACP, MALDEF, and LULAC 
will be well-equipped to play an active role in monitoring voting 
rights abuses. Apparently, analysts at the Voting Section are so 
intimately connected to civil rights groups and local political insiders 
that one analyst remarked that the “DOJ has a ‘whole slew of 
contacts’ in ‘almost every covered county.’”123 There is even some 
reason to believe that an opt-in approach could enhance monitoring 
by the civil rights groups that often provide the DOJ with information 
about local political conditions.124 Given the prevalence of a rich 
culture of communication between the Voting Section and local civil 
rights groups, and in light of the realistic hope that an opt-in approach 
would enhance the DOJ’s ability to monitor local conditions, 
collecting data on the capacity of representative organizations will be 
a manageable task. Nevertheless, Congress should confirm that all 
minority citizens in all covered jurisdictions really are protected by a 
local public interest group or civil rights organization. In the event 
that members of minority groups in some jurisdictions temporarily 
(or permanently) lose the benefit of representation by a private 
organization, Congress should provide a mechanism for streamlining 
the complaint filing process. Such a mechanism would ensure that the 
Voting Section would carefully examine complaints filed by private 
citizens, thereby “filling in” for the civil rights organizations that 
would be responsible for continuous monitoring of local political 
 
 121. After Ashcroft, it is difficult to define “under-deterrence” because the contextual 
standard announced by the Court appears to constitute a very liberal preclearance standard. If 
Congress decides that the totality of circumstances test that Ashcroft announced is reasonable, 
then from the perspective of deterrence it might not matter whether preclearance was 
mandatory or opt-in: because the same standard would apply in the case of mandatory or opt-in 
preclearance, the deterrence effect would be the same. Of course, the costs would be different: 
with opt-in preclearance, one would expect that the Voting Section of the DOJ would be less 
burdened with preclearance requests. 
 122. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 123. Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 18 n.56) (citing an anonymous telephone 
interview). 
 124. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
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conditions. In this way, ordinary citizens would be able to enjoy the 
protection of (opt-in) Section 5 during periodic lapses in 
representation.125 
3. Minimizing the Opportunities for Fraud.  Third, Congress 
should consider ways of designing an opt-in system to minimize 
fraud.126 The incentives for manipulating the opt-in process would be 
considerable.127 Drawing on modern labor regulation, a restrictive 
registration process could be implemented to confirm the legitimacy 
of civil rights organizations that claim to represent minority groups. 
This process would be modeled after the union certification process 
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).128 Mirroring the 
National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) involvement in the union 
certification process,129 the Voting Section would be responsible for 
 
 125. Attaching this provision to an opt-in Section 5 could cause problems. For instance, if 
community members felt dissatisfied with the local political organization representing them, 
they could file these pro se complaints with the Voting Section out of irritation and impatience. 
Mindful of the fact that credibility with the Voting Section is threatened by pro se complaints, 
civil rights organizations with inadequate resources (but a genuine desire to help) might 
periodically file preclearance petitions without regard for whether minority voting influence was 
truly being diminished by local political bargaining. 
 126. Professor Gerken argues that the community economic development movement 
provides a model for thinking about how fraud might be minimized under an opt-in regime. See 
id. (manuscript at 31) (“[W]e would expect that litigation over who genuinely represents racial 
minorities will, in the long run, generate more accountability and representation for those 
communities than the current regime.”). Because funding for community economic 
development corporations (CDCs) depends upon ensuring that CDCs actually do represent the 
interests of their constituents, there is competition among CDCs for the right to represent local 
communities. That competition benefits community members, because only the most vigorous 
advocates for local community interests are likely to receive funding on a continuous basis. 
There is one important difference between CDCs and civil rights organizations that 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that similar kinds of competition among civil 
rights organizations will spring up to the benefit of minority communities: the funding for civil 
rights organizations does not directly depend upon their success in aiding the Voting Section in 
its enforcement efforts. 
 127. See id. (manuscript at 30) (“The moment that elites learn that community support 
matters, they will presumably try to create ‘shell’ organizations that claim community support 
but are little more than political shills. We should also expect political parties to try to capture 
existing community groups and to fake the appearance of a healthy decisionmaking process.”). 
 128. For a skeptical overview of the union certification process, see Andrew Strom, 
Rethinking the NLRB’s Approach to Union Recognition Agreements, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 50, 53–55, 55 (1994) (“A simple look at the tools available to each side in a union 
campaign election suggests that management has an advantage.”). 
 129. It is beyond the scope of this Note to consider all of the differences between the 
employment and voting rights contexts. However, one difference is important for designing an 
effective registration process to certify civil rights organizations: although employers have an 
03__EDEN.DOC 10/13/2006  8:50 AM 
1212 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:1183 
overseeing the certification process for civil rights groups and public 
interest organizations. Only certified organizations would be 
permitted to petition the Voting Section in the event that political 
bargaining breaks down. Assuming that the registration process was 
designed to closely reflect the NLRB certification process, this system 
would allow minority members to file petitions to certify and 
decertify civil rights organizations. This representation system would 
not necessarily have to adopt the equivalent of labor law’s principle 
of one union, one group of employees; rather, this system could allow 
minority communities to be represented by multiple public interest 
groups and civil rights organizations simultaneously. 
Drawing on contemporary labor law has the advantage of 
providing some hints about what problems would emerge if an official 
certification process were adopted to minimize fraud in an opt-in 
system. The main disadvantage of this system is that it would impose 
greater restrictions on analysts in the Voting Section of the DOJ. 
Currently, analysts are permitted to speak freely with a wide range of 
local civil rights organizations and private individuals who may have 
helpful insights into local political conditions and practices.130 If a 
certification regime were implemented to mitigate fraud, analysts 
might not be able to take advantage of the wide range of contacts 
they have cultivated in covered jurisdictions. Another disadvantage of 
this solution is that the DOJ would have to dedicate valuable 
resources to the certification process. Yet this is just one potential 
solution to the problem of legitimate representation. 
Congress could alternatively determine that a formal antifraud 
procedure or policy is unnecessary. The argument for this approach is 
that community leaders and civil rights organizations are not only 
unlikely to engage in turf wars,131 analysts in the Voting Section could 
be vested with plenary authority to disregard evidence put forth by 
phony civil rights organizations that a bargaining process was fair and 
 
interest in blocking union certification bids in the employment context, there is no equivalent 
group or institution that has an interest in interfering with or preventing the registration process 
for civil rights and public interest organizations in this context. To be sure, it could be that civil 
rights organizations would compete with one another for the privilege of representing minority 
groups. But this would be a welcome development, if indeed it emerged. 
 130. See Gerken, supra note 2 (manuscript at 17) (explaining that when preclearance 
requests are filed, informal calls are often made by the DOJ to local civil rights groups or to an 
elected minority official to determine if “there is a problem”).  
 131. Id. (manuscript at 31) (“Community group leaders . . . have every incentive to work out 
a consensus or compromise; their power, after all, comes from standing together.”). 
03__EDEN.DOC 10/13/2006  8:50 AM 
2006] VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1213 
equitable. Without special reason to anticipate poor judgment on the 
part of analysts in the Voting Section, this solution appears quite 
appealing. Regardless of which particular solution is adopted, it is 
imperative that Congress be prepared to deal with the political 
manipulation and maneuvering that inevitably would accompany the 
transition to an opt-in preclearance regime. 
4. The Purpose of Section 5.  Fourth, and perhaps most 
importantly, Congress must articulate the main purpose of Section 5 
of the VRA in a post-Ashcroft world. If Congress decides that 
Ashcroft was rightly decided, then the answer is simple: Section 5’s 
purpose is to provide minority groups with a very flexible—perhaps 
too flexible—preclearance standard. But many believe that Ashcroft 
provides inadequate protection for minorities; others have suggested 
that Ashcroft gives a right of redress for minorities where none is 
genuinely needed.132 Ashcroft thus raises a critical question about 
Section 5: if covered jurisdictions no longer employ poll taxes, literacy 
tests, and a host of other formal impediments to the minority 
franchise,133 precisely what is Section 5 designed to prevent? This 
fourth and final inquiry should, and certainly will, be a matter of 
heated dispute as Congress conducts hearings in connection with 
reauthorization. As such, this inquiry is not one specific to the opt-in 
approach; it is highly germane to any reauthorization debate. 
Section 5 is not a relic, a tool that was once useful in combating 
voting rights abuses but which should be relegated to the dustbin of 
history. But to remain relevant, Congress must clarify what its 
purpose is today. It may be that Section 5 is primarily helpful to 
minority voters by virtue of the political leverage that it gives to their 
chosen representatives in the context of political bargaining. If that is 
the role that Congress conceives for Section 5, then it is worth asking 
whether that leverage is best preserved with a flexible standard (as in 
 
 132. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1730 (“One way of reading Ashcroft is to see the Court 
suggesting that black voters in Georgia have moved from a world of discrete status meriting 
protections external to the political system to a situation more closely approximating the normal 
give and take of politics.”). 
 133. See Scott Gluck, Congressional Reaction to Judicial Construction of Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 337, 345 (1996) (noting that “the 1965 
Voting Rights Act was originally and primarily aimed at eliminating obstacles to Black 
registration, such as literacy tests, good character tests, the practice of purging Blacks from the 
voting rolls once they were registered, and poll taxes” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Ashcroft) or with a firm rule (as in Beer).134 Because preclearance, if 
reauthorized, will certainly be the subject of constitutional challenge, 
it is important to provide an answer to this query so that Congress can 
assemble an evidentiary record with an eye to defending preclearance 
if and when it is challenged before the Supreme Court.135 More 
importantly, even though an opt-in regime might be less costly to 
implement and administer for the Voting Section, unless the specific 
protections afforded by Section 5 are tailored to a meaningful 
regulatory end, it is doubtful that an opt-in system would produce 
better outcomes for minority groups than the current regime. This is 
perhaps the central flaw in Professor Gerken’s opt-in proposal: it 
takes for granted the legitimacy of existing Section 5 standards and 
then proposes a way of implementing those standards in a new way. 
This new implementation method certainly could reduce the cost of 
Section 5 enforcement for the Voting Section and promote local 
community involvement in political decision making. These features 
of Gerken’s opt-in proposal make it a very appealing one. But if the 
standards embedded in Section 5 are not actually capable of 
protecting minority voting influence, or if those standards could be 
substantially improved by modifying Section 5 or the preclearance 
process in a more general fashion, at best the opt-in proposal would 
only produce marginal benefits for the Voting Section and for local 
political engagement. 
It is uncertain how long it would take Congress to complete these 
four inquiries. It is also likely that some of these inquiries—
particularly the final inquiry concerning the proper purpose and 
 
 134. For a concise and powerful statement of the myriad problems with Ashcroft, see 
Karlan, supra note 18, at 22 (“Georgia v. Ashcroft takes a significantly different tack. It 
reintroduces the considerations of governance that Presley seemed to exclude, transforming 
them into justifications for approving plans that decrease minority voters’ ability to elect the 
representatives of their choice. And it engages in the kind of noncomparative purpose analysis 
that Bossier II seemed to reject, in a fashion that dramatically undercuts the statutory burden of 
proof, a burden born of long, bitter, and all-too-recent experience with covered jurisdictions’ 
indifference and hostility toward the political aspirations of minority voters.”). 
 135. See Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of 
the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 180 (2005) (arguing that 
“Congress would be well advised to craft the best evidentiary record possible to support a 
renewed preclearance provision”). But cf. William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, 
Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 91 (2001) (observing that the tendency to 
conduct legislative record review is a relatively new phenomenon, and that its core purpose is 
primarily to “smoke out” illegitimate congressional motives; this suggests that legislative record 
review is only appropriate where Congress has legislated in order to enforce a “general police 
power”). 
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scope of Section 5—could open the door to a number of legislative 
possibilities that may or may not arise in connection with the debate 
that is already afoot about reauthorizing the existing version of 
Section 5.136 It is also unclear precisely how this task should be 
undertaken. The details should largely be left up to the discretion of 
Congress. But because it seems unlikely that all four inquiries could 
be successfully completed before Section 5’s sunset date in 2007, 
Congress should reauthorize the extant version of Section 5 in the 
interim while they inquire into the effectiveness of an opt-in 
approach. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that the most pressing question is not 
whether to reauthorize Section 5, but which version of Section 5 
should be reauthorized in 2007. On the assumption that the opt-in 
system raises complicated empirical questions that will be difficult to 
answer in the coming year, this Note contends that preclearance 
should be reauthorized on a temporary basis to allow Congress 
sufficient time to consider the likely benefits and drawbacks of an 
opt-in approach. The viability of opt-in preclearance depends on the 
resources and commitment of civil rights organizations across all 
covered jurisdictions. Despite the success that the Voting Section has 
had in the past through reliance on information provided by these 
organizations, Congress should consider with care whether the proxy-
representation scheme at the heart of opt-in preclearance would serve 
the interests of minority communities in every covered jurisdiction. 
To be sure, temporary reauthorization is not a panacea. Many 
obstacles that minority voters face—from coping with felon 
disenfranchisement137 to unfair election practices138 to intimidation 
tactics at the polls139—will not be cured by reauthorizing Section 5. 
 
 136. For a helpful general overview of the particular issues that Congress has considered in 
connection with evaluating Section 5 during previous floor debates and hearings, see generally 
Gluck, supra note 133. 
 137. According to one source, 1.4 million African American men are prohibited from voting 
due to felon disenfranchisement laws. JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MALLER, LOSING THE VOTE: 
THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1998), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote/usvot98o.htm. 
 138. See generally SHELDON RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, BANANA REPUBLICANS: HOW 
THE RIGHT WING IS TURNING AMERICA INTO A ONE-PARTY STATE (2004) (chronicling the 
impact of unfair election practices on the ability of minorities to elect candidates of choice).  
 139. See Pamela S. Karlan, Elections and Change under Voting With Dollars, 91 CAL. L. 
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Reauthorization of Section 5 in its current form would not address 
serious concerns about the appropriate scope of Section 5 review. For 
“front-burner political decisions”140 like redistricting, reauthorizing 
(mandatory) preclearance is not an optimal solution. The reason is 
simple: redistricting decisions are unique in that they have historically 
been occasioned by heightened levels of partisan wrangling because 
the political stakes are so high. As Issacharoff intimates, applying the 
current version of preclearance to redistricting decisions in 
jurisdictions with “active partisan competition” blurs the line between 
protecting minority voting power and illegitimately entrenching the 
Democratic Party.141 Moreover, in a post-Ashcroft world, there is a 
significant danger that courts will be unable to identify redistricting 
plans that fail to protect minority voting influence.142 Nevertheless, in 
light of the nation’s collective ignorance about how precarious politics 
could become in the covered jurisdictions without some form of 
preclearance, renewal is the wisest course.143 
 
REV. 705, 710 (2003) (describing voter intimidation as a “serious problem”). 
 140. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 1730. 
 141. Issacharoff’s argument in this respect is a bit strange. On the one hand, he is not 
enthusiastic about Ashcroft because he believes that the totality of the circumstances test is 
difficult to administer. On the other hand, Issacharoff appears to laud the Court for recognizing 
that political bargaining has become a prominent part of politics in parts of the Deep South. See 
id. (“In contemplating that partisan competition may erode the traditional forms of section 5 
review, the Court invites further inquiry into whether the administrative model of preclearance 
captures the protections necessary in jurisdictions with active partisan competition.”). 
 142. It is worth noting that if Congress explicitly adopted the Beer standard for 
retrogression—a test that unlike Ashcroft does not authorize courts to examine the totality of 
the circumstances to determine whether a redistricting plan runs afoul of Section 5—some 
believe that the constitutionality of Section 5 would be imperiled. See generally Hasen, supra 
note 135.  
 143. Impact and Effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (October 25, 2005) (statement of Laughlin McDonald, Director, ACLU 
Voting Rights Project). 
